examples of how the polysemic character of sexual exploitation can be used to create a sense of panic.
This begins with the title of the article itself: "Recruiters already active in World Cup cities". Given that recruiting for prostitution (both of adults and minors) goes on non-stop in Brazil (and elsewhere) and given that just three of the Cup cities (Rio, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte) contain more than 10% of the nation's population, this headline shouldn't be news to anyone. It generates a specter of monsters among us, however, and implies that their presence has a causal connection to the Cup. The article then describes how these recruiters are "setting up small armies [of child prostitutes] capable of satisfying [tourists'] demands for sex", presenting as a given that tourists coming to the games want sex --in particular, sex with children.
Globo is unable to offer any examples of this sort of thing actually occurring, however. The main source it cites about the supposed threat is a study of the German and South African World Cups and the London Olympics. As was the case of Sister Bottani's remarks, this report points to an increase in risks of child exploitation, particularly non-sexual labor exploitation. In fact, the report emphasizes that there is no reliable evidence that sexual exploitation actually increases during these events (Brackenridge, et al, 2013: 14-18) . Globo translated this, however, into an assertion that "international evidence indicates that an increase in the sexual exploitation of children and adolescents does indeed occur during megaevents: this is a fact" (Benevides, 2014) .
Risk of exploitation thus once again turns into proof of exploitation; labor exploitation confuses with sexual exploitation; increases in accusations of CSE become increases in verifiable incidents. All of these semiotic shifts and slides are given potency through their linkage to the monstrous term, sexual exploitation of children, which short-circuits critical thought.
When the Globo article came out, it was passed around the social networking circuits of Brazil's main anti-trafficking and anti-CSE organizations. It was discussed in state and federal anti-human trafficking committees, social welfare and child protection services and in the NGOs which were gearing up for the Cup. In fact, all of the Globo article's principal claims had been in circulation among these groups for quite some time. The authors can attest that attempts to relativize the claims or to present contrasting data were generally met with resistance and often open hostility. In short, apocalyptic readings of the rumors in the press regarding CSE and trafficking and their supposed connections to mega-sporting events were largely accepted at face value whenever politicians, NGOs, and social welfare experts gathered to discuss plans for the Cup. The rumors became part of the culturally adjudicated set of truths that these groups claimed to believe and, even where that belief was less than whole-hearted, they were accepted as a necessary white lie. After one meeting, researchers engaged with a highly placed elected federal official in the anti-CSE movement who had just finished a presentation repeating the sorts of claims discussed above. When we presented them with a set of studies questioning their data, they surprised us, saying "Oh, I've gone through that stuff". When we asked why they continued to claim, for example, that South Africa had seen a spike in CSE due to the 2010 Cup when nothing of the sort had been proven, they responded "Why are you fighting me on this? Brazil has a huge child sexual tourism [sic] problem and anything we can do to cast more light on that is valid...
[I]f my facts aren't 100% correct, but contribute to motivate people to take action [against CSE], then why worry about them?" A clearer justification for advocacy discourse would be hard to find.
Child sexual exploitation in Brazil: concepts and numbers
But does Brazil have a huge child sexual exploitation problem linked to foreign tourism? Actual legal cases of child sexual exploitation involving tourists seem to be quite few in Brazil, with apparently far less than 100 being reported annually by the police nationwide 11 . Whether this is due to under-reporting, bad police work or because there really are few cases, we cannot say. Certainly, however, a major contributing factor to this question is that it is not clear what constitutes sexual exploitation in Brazil.
Sexual exploitation is referenced but rarely defined in Brazilian law. The only place
where it is openly connected by the penal code to actual practices is in regards to the prostitution of people under 18 years of age. Although the age of consent in Brazil is formally 14, many interpretations of the "Statute of Children and Adolescents" (ECA) classify as sexual abuse any sexual relationship between "children and adolescents" (i.e. people under 18) and "adults" (those 18 or over). 12 Generally speaking, however, people in the 14-18 age bracket may engage in sexual activities but not prostitution. If their parents (and, increasingly, other adult authorities such as teachers, social workers, or the police) object to their sexual choices, however, the case can go to court under a "corrupting a minor" charge and a judge will be called upon to decide if said activities constitute abuse. As one can image, subjective reasoning based on religious, moral, or political values can be injected at this point into the nominally objective legal process.
No one has yet studied this topic in Brazil, but as Roger Lancaster points out in the U.S.
American context (2012), homo-affective relationships have a long tradition of being 11 Data on this point is difficult to find. We are going on media reports and claims made by members of the State and Federal Prosecutor's Offices during state anti-trafficking and child protection meetings. morally classified as "pedophilia" in these sorts of cases. Other "questionable" or nontraditional relationships are also subject to moral double standards. These include relationships involving partners of greatly different ages (say a 50 year old and a 17 year old), partners of different classes or ethnicities, or -notoriously -foreign partners.
Furthermore, "prostitution" itself is defined in a highly subjective and arbitrary manner by many proponents of the ECA, most particularly members of Rio's child protective services (CPS). In the post-Cup meetings organized by the Childhood and Infancy Foundation (FIA) of the state of Rio de Janeiro, police, social workers and human rights bureaucrats alike made it very clear that they thought that "prostitution" (or "sexual exploitation") could be defined as any situation in which a minor received any sort of material benefit at all during the course of a sexual/affective relationship. Under this extremely strict interpretation, a 16 years old boy who decided to pay for 16
year old girlfriend's lunch could be accused of "sexual exploitation". Normative adolescent (and adult) courting behavior was thus defined by these CPS bureaucrats and technicians as "prostitution" and thus illegal.
Single foreign men have attracted accusations of sexual abuse in Brazil at least since the 1990s (Piscitelli, 2004) . As we have shown above, the foreign sexual exploiter is a common trope, in the Brazilian media and politics. However, when we turn to Disque 100 (the most popular source for "advocacy numbers" regarding CSE), we find that things are not quite as extreme as Liliam Sá, Globo and The Chicago Tribune report. Tables of the total denunciations of sexual violence against children and some 5% of the total denunciations of violence against children, all told. However, the number of denunciations occurring within the context of tourism is astonishingly low: 84, or less than 1/10th of 1% of all denunciations of abuse against children in 2013.
The laws regarding the sexual exploitation of adults in Brazil are even more vague than those relating to children, but we will not discuss them here for the simple reason that, in the run up to the Cup, adult sex workers were almost entirely ignored by everyone in the social welfare, human rights, journalistic and political fields dealing with these issues 14 . Time and again, when we tried to talk to NGOs and public officials about the need to prepare adult sex workers for the Cup, we were told that adult sex work was "problematic" and that efforts were thus being directed towards saving children from sexual exploitation. The singular exception to this (aside from the Prostitution Observatory's own efforts in conjunction with the Davida Prostitute's Rights Association) was the State Committee to Combat Human Trafficking, which during the week before the games began, set up a United Nations' anti-trafficking display (Gift Box) in Vila Mimosa, one of Rio de Janeiro's largest red light districts.
By early May 2014, the stage had been set. Thousands of political and social actors
were coming together to combat child sexual exploitation during the games. Hundreds of pages of media articles and hours of T.V. specials (plus social media and internetbased reports) had driven the message home: Brazil needed to get ready for massive increase in sexual violence directed against children. The general consensus, going by every media report available at the time, was that the efforts being made to prevent this were too little, too late.
So what happened in Rio during the 2014 FIFA World Cup?
Rio attacks CSE
First of all, we need to state that, of course, children and adolescents do sell sex to foreign tourists in Rio de Janeiro. In our years of research, we have personally observed three confirmed cases. Furthermore, we have witnessed a constant trickle of late-teen prostitutes through the Copacabana nightlife scene over the years and we are certain that some of these young men and women were minors. In a typical night of fieldwork on Copacabana, between 0-2% of all the prostitutes we encounter look like they might be underage.
That said, two caveats must be made:
1) Almost all of these young people look to be in their late teens: i.e. 16-19. We have seen vanishingly few prostitutes who look to be under 16.
2) When we say "between 0-2%", it should be noted that in more than 2/3rds of our hundreds of nights of fieldwork, that percentage has been 0 and only twice did it reach 2%.
In short, there seem to be very few underage prostitutes working the foreign sex trade on Copacabana Beach.
Nor have we found many minor sex workers elsewhere in town (and it should be noted that more than 80% of foreign tourists who buy sex in Rio do so in Copacabana (Blanchette, Neuhauser, da Silva, Teifenbacher, 2015)). One of our informants, a 50-year old madame who runs one of the many sexual commercial venues in downtown Rio explains why:
I don't know why the media lies so much about this subject. Look, nobody hires minors knowingly. Why would you? They only put your house at risk! If the police come in and there's a minor, at a minimum, the manager or owner is going to have to pay a big bribe to stay open.
But more likely, they'll arrest everyone: prostitutes, clients… everyone.
The risk isn't worth it compared to the little money the house could make. And we have a lot more women working than we need today.
Nobody needs to be out recruiting children.
The problem is that you have girls -these 16 and 17 year olds -who want to work and get a false ID so they can trick the house. I look carefully at all the IDs of the girls who work here and xerox them and everything, but not everyone is as meticulous as I am. So every once in a while, the police come into a brothel and find a minor.
When police do find minors in brothels, they routinely arrest everyone involved, even when the minors are not involved in prostitution. This has resulted in cases where sex workers' or brothel employees' children have been confused with child prostitutes.
Shortly before the World Cup, police raided the Vila Mimosa red light district after a 20 day investigation and arrested the owner and manager of one of its clubs, accusing them of favoring CSE. Two of the women working in the bar were revealed to be 17 years old (Extra, 2014) 15 .
In short, everything indicates that while CSE does indeed occur in Rio de Janeiro, as in all big cities, it is neither endemic nor ignored by the police. It generally seems to involve late adolescents (16-17), particularly those who have been left homeless and family-less (particularly LGBT youth). It is not particularly prevalent in the region of the city most notorious for sexual tourism, Copacabana.
Our previous decade of fieldwork in Rio had left us well aware of all these facts before beginning our research into the effects of the Cup on sex work. Nevertheless, we expected to see an uptick in the numbers of underage prostitutes working in
Copacabana during the games. First of all, the largest concentrations of young prostitutes that we've registered in the neighborhood have taken place during big tourism-oriented events. Additionally, while there is no solid proof that prostitution (let alone human trafficking or CSE) increases during mega-sporting events (Brackenridge, 2013; GAATW, 2012), we felt that Brazil's international reputation as a "sexy" country might make FIFA 2014 the exception.
The weeks before the games showed no major changes in the patterns of prostitution in the city. A larger than usual number of women started frequenting (Ruvolo, 2012) . Many people believed that the 2012 raids were a "dry run"
for the Cup.
That Balcony (and a nearby sex motel) would be closed on accusations linked to CSE, however, was shocking. We had followed the owner's efforts at keeping minor prostitutes out of his restaurant for years and could attest to the fact that Balcony was one of the few establishments in Rio that at least occasionally asked to see patrons' IDs, the restaurant's clientele would mix with the people in the park, so it is quite possible, as police allege, that underaged sex workers could be found in and around Balcony. This is particularly significant given the owner's prior legal difficulties with keeping young transwomen out of his bar: it is very possible that security guards were told to allow the transwomen in the park to use the restaurant's bathrooms to avoid more legal entanglements.
Balcony was allowed to reopen immediately after the Cup. With no arrests and no evidence presented that the restaurant was responsible for CSE, it is hard to escape the conclusion that it was shut specifically as a political measure to remove it as a backdrop to the FIFA Fan Fest, directly across the street. Its closure was hailed by child protection authorities as a major blow against exploitation, however. The Infancy and Adolescence
Foundation ( The same suspected minor prostitutes who had been present in Lido before
Balcony had been closed continued on in the park. We talked to every young sex worker we could, sounding them with questions as to their background and age. Many of the women whom we thought looked most likely to be minors showed us ID cards proving that they were not. This was the case of the woman in Image 5, who researchers believed to be underage (she was, in fact, 20 years old).
We were never able to confirm the presence of a single underage woman prostitute in Praça do Lido during the World Cup. However, during the second week of the games, we finally identified our first minor prostitute: Lana, a young white transwoman who had come down from her home in the mountains near Rio to have sex at the Cup.
She would not tell us her age, although she appeared to be 16 or 17 and indicated that she was a minor. She had recently had her first sexual experience and was interested in having more, "for fun". However, Lana reasoned that, as long as she was going to have sex, she might as well get paid to do it "with a nice gringo".
Relativizing "sexual exploitation" 17
Lana's story illustrates an important fact about the sexual exchanges that took place during the World Cup: many couldn't be easily classified as either simply for pleasure or for money. 18 There was a mixture of sexual, affective, social, and economic interests on display in the spaces in Rio de Janeiro where foreigners interacted with Brazilians, complicating a clear definition of sexual exploitation and the presumptions that the media and Brazilian politicians made about sexual tourism. One example of these interactions illustrates the problems involved in presuming in reliably descrying CSE.
Researchers conversed with two young white, working class Brazilian women, accompanying a pair Colombian men at a street bar in Copacabana. During the course of these conversations, the women confirmed that they were from Rio's northern suburbs and had come to FIFA Fan Fest to have fun. They had met the Colombians (who appeared to be about 25 years old) on Copacabana Beach. The girls did not state their age, despite a number of attempts by the researchers to find this out (we generally considered this sort of reticence an indication that the person was underage), but they appeared to be 16 or 17.
After an hour of kisses and public displays of affection with the Colombians, interspersed with conversation with the researchers, the girls got up from their Sincere dating (legal for minors above 14 in Brazil) or prostitution (understood to be sexual exploitation for people between the ages of 14 and 18)? Our 12 years of experience observing interactions between foreign tourists and young carioca women in situations similar to this suggests that this was neither entirely one nor the other. We believe that it is quite possible than the girl was probably looking for romantic adventures in Copacabana and sought out a partner in order to have some fun, pay for her night, and --who knows --maybe give her a little extra cash. If the final conversation was like numerous others we've heard in other moments, the girl was saying she results were reported by researchers associated with our project who were working in other Cup cities. Needless to say, this was a far cry from the half-million plus kids who were supposedly coming to town to sell sex.
Meeting of the FIA committees 19 began a month after the games, consolidating the post-event reports of the various NGOs and governmental branches that had been involved in anti-sexual exploitation efforts during the Cup. We participated in these meetings and it quickly became clear that no one -not Disque 100, not any of the police forces, not CPS, not the Human Rights Secretariat, not the State Attorney's Office and certainly no participating NGOs -had been able to find any cases of child sexual exploitation during the Cup.
The overall sense of these meetings was one of bafflement and chagrin, expressed by the chairperson's question to the group: "Well, where was child sexual exploitation taking place, then, if we couldn't find it at the Cup?" Ironically, the person who could answer to that question was literally sitting to the chairperson's immediate right.
One of FIA's employees was, in fact, a child psychologist who we had interviewed Tourism: Brazil has its eye on you", this campaign was based on the belief that foreign male tourists were a principle axis for the propagation of CSE. However, as the psychologist related to us in 2004, the data collected from the hotline did not support this hypothesis. As pediatrician Lauro Monteiro Filho puts it:
The data gathered by ABRAPIA shows that [Brazil] "We concluded that [sexual tourism] was a problem, yes, but far from a primary problem. The real issue was in-family abuse and no one wanted to talk about that. So we stopped emphasizing sexual tourism in our materials".
This, then, was the same person who was helping chair the FIA committee meetings in 2014 and who had no answer to give their boss when they asked the question that was on everyone's mind: why hadn't we found any child sexual exploiters during the Cup?
During the meetings, it was revealed that many of the committee members had never read any scientific research regarding CSE in tourism and that much of their information about sexual tourism came from mass media sources. Few of the committee members we talked to had even read the findings regarding sexual exploitation of children, human trafficking and sexual tourism produced by Brazilian congressional inquiries into these phenomena.
A small number of committee members did know that there was little evidence linking CSE and tourism in Brazil. When we asked them why this hadn't been taken into consideration before the Cup, they generally reported that they saw the event as an excellent opportunity for advocacy discourse. As one CPS professional put it:
"We have such a huge problem with child abuse that I was willing to welcome literally anything that tried to cast a light on it. I was hoping that some resources would be directed towards the real problem, which isn't happening in the tourism zones".
A FIA employee, responding to the same question during the committee meetings, said "Well, it was important that we do something, even if it didn't generate the results expected. Anything was better than nothing".
This, however, was met with another question of ours: given that the only real action that had been taken in Rio involved shutting down Balcony and putting 122 families out of work and given that many of these people could later be found in Praça do Lido, with their children, trying to make money by selling food and drinks to the crowd of sex workers and clients that gathered there, could one really say that the effects of the committee's actions were positive or even neutral?
At this point, a representative from the state prosecutor's office spoke up: "We were justified in shutting down Balcony because there were indications of child sexual exploitation". We asked what indications? The representative claimed they couldn't say,
as the case was still under investigation. We asked if there was indeed evidence which would stand up in court, why was nobody arrested and why was the restaurant allowed to reopen, immediately after the end of the Cup? The representative simply said "We did what seemed right at the time, given an emergency. It wasn't meant to be an exemplary operation". This, in spite of committee president Alexandre Nascimento's claims to the media that the operation was precisely that! The presentator could not say who one could call to make a denunciation (other than Disque 100), nor what would happen after police or CPS workers, following a denunciation, discovered a child prostitute. They could not say whether minors found selling sex would be forced to go to shelters or back to their parents. They couldn't say what could be done in cases were LGBT youth had been turned out by their families into the streets. They couldn't even inform the committee if any children's shelters existed in Rio that had experience dealing with victims of sexual exploitation or LGBT
youth.
This highlighted one possible reason why so much emphasis had been placed on "conscientization campaigns" consisting of flyers, t-shirts and posters repeatedly presenting Disque 100 before and during the Cup: it seems that the collected organizations brought together by the FIA committees to combat sexual exploitation during the games simply had little more to offer.
We were finally asked what we thought the city should do with regards to the situation we saw during the games in the Praça do Lido. "Why not peer educators in a community-based drop in center?" we replied. These concepts had to be explained to the members of the committee, most of whom had apparently never heard of them before. We described initiatives that we'd seen in Europe where adult sex workers were given a space to interface with and educate other sex workers regarding STDs and sexual violence, where minor prostitutes could feel safe making an initial approach to someone without feeling that they'd be immediately turned into the police.
"If we parked a bus, say, in Lido and staffed it with health and human welfare people who've done AIDS outreach, and get them to recruit local sex workers as peer educators, we'd have a good staff of first responders on hand for the Olympic games".
As we described this, we could see pens moving on paper all across the room.
Conclusions: legacies
The above article might make one think that nothing had been accomplished by the mobilizations around the panic regarding sexual exploitation in Rio de Janeiro during the World Cup. However, as Roger Lancaster has pointed out in the context of the United States, the laws and policies created to meet sexual panics frequently have effects that last much longer than the headlines that inspire them (Lancaster, 2012) .
When it comes to the World Cup, we can point to four main legacies created by the laws and policies hastily enacted in 2012-2014 to combat the orgy that never happened.
The first was the administrative expansion of Brazil's "Foreigners' Statute". A second change has been the forced closure of a large number of properties involved with commercial sex. Balcony is the most obvious of these in Rio. While it opened again after the Cup, it was closed by judicial mandate right before Carnival 2015, this time on the allegation that its bar license wasn't in order. All sex crime charges appear to have been dropped against the restaurant, but its owner finally sold the property in March 2015. We interviewed him a week before the restaurant closed for good. He claimed that the city wanted the property as part of its urban renewal schemes and that they already had a new owner lined up to receive it. "It's obvious they will continue to find excuses to close me down," he said. "They don't have a legal leg to stand on, but they don't need it. All they need is an alarming excuse before any big 2015) . It is quite possible that, by the time the 2016 Olympic Games are over, there will be almost no independent prostitutes left working the tourism scene on Copacabana and that most commercial sex will be in closed venues under the direct control of club, sauna and massage parlor owners and managers.
A third change which has occurred has been an increase in violence directed against sex workers, particularly on the part of the police. Across the bay, the downtown redevelopment projects of the city of Niteroi have been funded as part of the overarching "Marvelous Port" urban renewal project being enacted in the name of preparing Rio and the surrounding region for the mega-sporting events of the Cup and
Olympics. Shortly before the opening of the Cup, police raided the Caixa Federal
Building (an urban renewal priority in the Marvelous Port project: see Murray, 2014 for more context), illegally evicting some 100 prostitutes who worked there, allegedly stealing from and raping several of them during the course of the operation. The justification for the raid was "investigation of sexual exploitation", although many people pointed to the fact that the building is on the city's list for gentrification. The women who complained to the press about their treatment were threatened and one was kidnapped and tortured by men she identified as being police. This same woman was tricked into making false witness by a local precinct captain, who then used her "testimony" as an excuse to arrest alleged exploiters. When the woman complained that she didn't authorize police use of her statements, the captain reportedly replied to her "Well, now if you show up dead, people will say it was the criminals who did you in and not us". 20
This was the most radical example of police violence which we have documented, but other episodes of harassment and violence during law enforcement operations targeting "sexual exploitation" have been related to us by carioca sex workers in the last few years.
But by far the most far-reaching impact we witnessed during and following the World Cup was the transformation of human-rights-based rhetoric regarding the protection of children into rhetoric justifying their violent exclusion from touristoriented public space.
Brazil is notorious for its police violence, which is often directed against children.
Unlike claims of rampant CSE in the context of foreign tourism, these claims are relatively well-supported with evidence. Just to mention two notorious cases from opposite ends of the last quarter century, in 1993, military police murdered six street children and two adults in cold blood in front of Rio's central cathedral in Candelaria.
Only three of the police involved were ever convicted, but they remain at liberty today. 21
In April 2015, military police shot and killed a ten year old boy who was sitting on the the same number as killed by police in the U.S. in the 30 years ending in 2012 (Forum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2014). Over the 10 year period between 2003 and 2012, some 50 children and adolescents were killed by police in the state of Rio de Janeiro alone (Mariz, 2015) . As this article was being prepared, however, 87% of Brazilians supported reducing the age of majority for criminal acts to 16 and the Brazilian Federal
Chamber of Deputies has just voted to do exactly that (Folha de São Paulo, 2015) . Brazilian law has long defended the concept of "discretionary powers" whereby police are authorized to operate according "to the interests of the State and the res publica" even where these are not entirely codified by law (Leal, 1918; 122) . Obviously, this leaves a lot of leeway for subjective and moralistic activity on the part of individual officers. Publications like the state prosecutor's manual guide officers in understanding
State interests in the use of their discretionary powers. They are thus often a better indication of how police are encouraged to interpret reality, in day-to-day police work, than the actual laws themselves. In the pages of Enfrentamento, then, we see what sort of "signs" are understood by the state legal authorities as "indications" of CSE, calling for police intervention.
13 "indications" are given and most of them focus on the "circulation" or "concentration" of children and adolescents. Here are some of the specific forms of "circulation" or "concentration" of minors which the police are advised to watch out for:
-On streets at night.
-At gas stations or along highways.
-At addresses where there is no indication that minors should be (how this is to be determined is unexplained).
-In bars or nightclubs.
-In public sports courts or fields where adults systematically hang out.
-At or near schools where adults are present, often in the forms of popcorn or candy salesmen.
-At places where there are a lot of taxi or truck drivers.
-At places where there have been previous reports of sexual exploitation or the dealing or consumption of drugs (this last bit in and of itself indicates that pretty much every square meter of Rio de Janeiro is "at risk" for CSE).
Given the banal nature of most of these situations, it's hard to avoid concluding that the mere presence of minors in public spaces is, in and of itself, as a sign of CSE, especially when said minors are not accompanied "their parents or responsible adults". It should be noted in this context, as our field work during the Cup demonstrated, that the circulation and concentration of children in public spaces -especially near bars, gas stations, truck stops, night clubs and etc. -is extremely common, given children's
